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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. J. CORNELL and AMBROSE 
BLACK, d/b/a Country Club 
Foods, a Partnership, 
Petitioners and Appellants. 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
9272 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the interest of clarity, the Tax Commission 
will herein take the liberty of amplifying the state-
ment of facts set out by taxpayer. 
In the course of the audit referred to by peti-
tioner, the Tax Commission examined sales tickets, 
sales journals, stamps on hand, any oleomargarine on 
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hand and purchase records in the possession of Coun-
try Club Foods and allowed credit for any inventories, 
stamp purchases and exempt sales. The balance was 
set up as taxable. The Tax Commission also found 
it necessary to examine the sales records of Ray and 
Whitney Brokerage Co., Salt Lake City, Utah, brok-
ers for Best Foods products as the purchase records of 
Country Club Foods for the period of August 31, 
19 56 to December of that year were not available for 
inspection, and the oleomargarine purchased by Coun-
try Club Foods for that period of time was purchased 
from said brokerage company. The Tax Commission 
did not find as a fact that the assessment in question 
was completely based upon the sales records of a third 
party, nor did it find as fact that the tax was not as-
sessed upon the presence of any oleomargarine pack-
ages or containers in petitioner's possession or place 
of business. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MADE BY THE 
TAX COMMISSION 
1. Section 59-18-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, imposed a tax upon the sale of oleomargarine 
in the state of Utah at the rate of 5c per pound if not 
artificially colored and 1 Oc per pound if artificially 
colored. 
2. Under Section 59-18-5, Utah Code Anno-
tateed, 19 53, it was provided that certain oleomarga-
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rine taxes were to be paid by affixing stamps prev-
iously purchased from the Tax Commission, within 
72 hours after the oleomargarine is received by any 
wholesaler, retailer or distributor within this state, 
provided, however, that any such oleomargarine had 
to be stamped before it was sold within this state. 
3. That under the same statute, the presence of 
any package or container in the place of business of any 
person required by the povisions of this chapter to 
stamp the same would be prima facie evidence that 
they were intended for sale and subject to tax under 
this chapter. 
4. Section 59-18-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53, gave the U tab State Tax Commission the 
power and duty to enter upon the premises of any 
taxpayer and to examine or cause to be examined by 
any agent or representative designated for that purpose 
any books, papers and memoranda bearing upon the 
taxes payable and to secure any other information di-
rectly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement of 
this chapter. 
5. That the statutes hereinabove referred to are 
wholly applicable to the issues in controversy. 
6. That the petitioner was required by the pro-
visions of the aforementioned statutes to stamp oleo-
margarine in its possession. 
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7. That through investigation by the Tax 
Commission, it was discovered that certain oleomar-
garine in the possession of petitioner had not been so 
stamped. The petitioner failed to show that such oleo-
margarine was not intended for sale and thus not sub-
ject to tax under the aforementioned statutes. 
8. That the petitioner is liable to the State Tax 
Commission under the laws of the state of Utah for 
the tax deficiency itemized in paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
the findings of fact hereinabove set forth. 
HISTORY OF 
OLEOMARGARINE LEGISLATION 
Oleomargarine is a food product commonly 
used as a butter substitute and is made from animal 
and vegetable oils or from vegetable oils alone. The 
elements which make up this product are essentially 
the same as those in butter; modern authorities, how-
ever, rcognize that there is often a difference in vitamin 
content. In its natural state oleomargarine generally 
has a white color. In view of a public preference for a 
yellow color and also in some cases actual! y to deceive 
the public, it has been common practice to color oleo-
margarine yellow artificial! y. It is also common to 
add artificial coloring to butter to enhance its yellow 
color during those seasons when butter is naturally 
pale (Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 18:79-96, Fe. '46). 
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Oleomargarine first become part of American 
commerce in the 1870's (33 Va. L. Rev. 631-41). In 
the early days of the manufacture and sale of oleo-
margarine and other butter substitutes, many fraudu-
lent schemes to increase sales were perpetrated on the 
public, and for this reason there arose a real need for 
public regulation. There was a prevalence of adult-
eration and deception of consumers by "palming off" 
the product as butter. Manufacture often took place 
under unsanitary conditions. The dairymen to protect 
their products and the public to protect themselves be-
gan to petition their legislatures to pass laws necessary 
to remove the chances of fraud. There was a real need 
for government regulation. So closely did the substi-
tutes presented to the public resemble actual butter 
that the fraudulent sale of oleomargarine as butter 
became easy and common. False or misleading adver-
tising, especially misleading implications that oleo-
margarine was a dairy product, was common ( 10 
Montana L. Rev. 46-63 Spring '49). 
The state legislation in this field is of three types: 
fiscal, prohibitory and regulatory, or combinations of 
the three. U tab's act is fiscal in nature, and has had at 
least up to the time of the passage of the statutes in 
question herein, regulatory features. Statutes similar 
in nature to Utah's are in effect in Idaho, Iowa, North 
Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin. 
The first Utah legislation dealing with oleomar-
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garine was passed in 1929 (Chapter 91). That act 
provided for a tax of 5c per pound on the sale of un-
colored and 1 Oc per pound on the sale of colored oleo-
margarine. It also required that a dealer in either prod-
uct must purchase a license permit, and a fee of $5.00 
was deposited in the general fund of the local govern-
ment issuing the permit. Each separate purchase of 
oleomargarine was to bear a stamp, prepared by the 
State Auditor and issued by him to the State Treas-
urer on requisition. The Treasurer was responsible 
for collection of the tax. 
This act was amended by Chapter 6, Laws of 
U tab, 19 3 0, to provide tba t the dealers' licenses were 
to be issued to the State Treasurer, and that the fees 
were to go to the general fund of the state. 
In 19 3 3 the legislature, in the Second Special 
Session, combined the oleomargarine statute (Chap-
ter 6, Laws of Utah, 1930, Title 66, revised statutes 
of 1933) and the tobacco statute (Chapter 5, Laws 
of Utah, 1930, Chapter 1, Title 93, revised statutes 
of 1933) into one chapter, Chapter 17. The revision 
was probably motivated by the similarities in the two 
laws. Both provided for licensing of dealers. Both 
imposed an excise tax. Both effected collection of that 
tax in the same manner: through the use of stamps; 
and both provided penal ties for violations. 
In 1947 (Chapter 138) 93-1-1 was amended 
by deleting the provision requiring dealers' licenses for 
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the sale of oleomargarine. The legislature, in 19 53, 
placed combined oleomargarine and tobacco statutes 
with Chapter 18 of Title 59, which is the present rev-
enue and taxation title of the Code. 
The Utah state legislature has also seen fit to pass 
regulatory measures related to imitations of butter in 
Title 4, Sections 27 and 28, U. C. A., 1953, under 
the Dairy Section of the Code. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS SET 
FORTH IN TITLE 59, CI-IAPTER 18, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS PRE-
SUMPTIVELY CONSTITUTIONAL. 
II. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS 
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES 
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 
23, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
III. NEITHER THE OLEOMARGARINE 
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, 
CHAPTER 18, UTAH CODE A N N 0 -
TATED, 1953, NOR THE ADMINISTRA-
TION THEREOF BY THE STATE TAX 
COMMISSION IN THIS CASE, VIOLATES 
THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
THE UNITED STATES OR UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
IV. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACTt AS 
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59 t CHAPTER 18t 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES 
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SECTION 24, 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
V. FEDERAL AND STATE CASE LAW 
UNIFORMLY SUPPORTS THE POSITION 
TAKEN BY THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, AS SET FORTH IN THIS 
BRIEF. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE INTENT C A N B E 
CLEARLY DISCERNED FROM THE PRO-
V I S I 0 N S OF THE OLEOMARGARINE 
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59t CHAP-
TER 18, UTAH CODE ANNOT A TEDt 
1953, AND THOSE PROVISIONS CAN BE 
HARMONIZED SO AS TO GIVE EACH 
ONE MEANING, AND SUPPORT THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT. 
VII. THE RULE OF STRICT CON-
STRUCTION OF TAXING STATUTES IS 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS SET 
FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18, 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS PRE-
SUMPTIVELY CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The taxpayers have attacked the constitutional-
ity of the legislative act herein involved. In doing 
so, they shoulder a difficult burden. Utah law is re-
plete with cases announcing and reaffirming the doc-
trine that the court is reluctant to interfere with the 
enactments of the legislature; that "All doubts should 
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a stat-
ute, and no act should be declared unconstitutional un-
less it is clearly and palpably so." and that the court 
must hold legislation constitutional if there is any rea-
sonable basis to sustain it. Newcomb v. Ogden City 
Public School Teachers, Retirement Comm., 121 Ut. 
503, 243 P. 2d 941 (1952); State v. Packard, 122 
Ut. 369,250 P. 2d 561 (1952); G. E. Co. v. Thrifty 
Sales, Inc., 5 Ut. 2d 326, 301 P. 2d 741 (1956); 
Denver and R. G. R. Co. v. Central W'eber Sewer Imp. 
Dist., 4 Ut. 2d 105, 287 P. 2d 884 (1955); Thomas 
v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Ut. 108, 197 P. 
2d477 (1948). 
If there are two alternatives to interpretation of 
a statute, one of which would make it constitutionally 
doubful and the other which would render it constitu-
tional, the latter will prevail. State Water Pollution 
Control Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Ut. 2d 247, 311 
P. 2d 3 70 ( 19 57). 
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II. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS 
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES 
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 
23, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Taxpayers assert that the Oleomargarine License 
Act as set forth in Title 18, U tab Code Annotated, 
19 53, is a violation of Article VI, Section 2 3 of the 
Constitution of Utah, which states that: 
''Except general appropriation bills, and 
bills for the codification and general revision of 
laws, no bill shall be passed containing more 
than one subject, which shall be clearly ex-
pressed in its title." 
It should be made clear that the title of an act 
need not be an index to all that the act provides. State 
v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075 
( 19 59). The fact, then, that the title to this Act does 
not completely list its contents is not fatal. 
"All that is required is that the subject 
matter of the Act be reasonably related to the 
title * * *." State v. Twitchell, 8 Ut. 
2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075 (1959). 
The title of the Act in question informs the 
reader that there are sections contained therein relating 
to oleomargarine and tobacco. The placement of the 
Act in the revenue and taxation title of the Code 
makes it clear that a tax of some type is imposed on 
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both products. It is true the title would lead one to 
erroneous! y believe that licenses were required to deal 
in both products, when a license is in fact required only 
for dealers in tobacco. However, though this high-
lights legislative oversight, it does so in a manner not 
fatal to the Act. The title and the act should be sur-
veyed in the light of the purpose of the constitutional 
provision, which is to guard against surreptitious or 
in ad vert en t inclusion of rna tters in the legislation of 
which the legislators and the public are not aware. A 
liberal view should be taken both of the act and the 
constitutional provision so as not to hamper the law 
making power. Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Ut. 2d 67, 
305 P. 2d 870 (1957). All doubts must be resolved 
in favor of the law. Utah State Fair Ass'n, et al. v. 
Green, et al., 68 Ut. 251, 249 P. 1016 (1926). In 
this case, then the sin is of commission not omission, so 
it does not violate the spirit and purpose of the act. 
State v. Kallas, et al., 97 Ut. 492, 94 P. 2d 414 
(1939). The title can be properly broader than the 
act. Cooley Taxation 4th E. ( 1924), Vol. I, Section 
. 499. 
"The constitutional requirement that an 
act contain but one subject clearly expressed in 
the title is not a technical restriction on the leg-
islature but is for the practical purpose of in-
forming the legislature and the public of the 
legislation proposed and a title which will lead 
into inquiry in the body of the act * * * 
is sufficient." Thomas V. Daughters of Utah 
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Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P. 2d 477 
(1948). 
The title of an act is sufficient if it is not produc-
tive of surprise and fraud and calculated to mislead 
the legislature or the people, but fairly apprises the leg-
islators and public of the subject matter of the legisla-
tion and puts anyone having an interest therein on 
inquiry. Martineau v. Crabbe, 46 Ut. 327, 150 P. 
304 ( 1915). 
It is true that the provisions contained under an 
act should be germane. However, the fact that the 
provisions differ in some respects does not render the 
act unconstitutional. State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 
314, 333 P. 2d 1075 (1959). 
Taxpayers admit on page 11 of their brief that 
the imposition of excise taxes on the sale of oleo-
margarine and tobacco and the provisions deriving rev-
enue therefrom are probably cognate. It is respectfully 
contended by the Tax Commission that these provi-
sions are indeed cognate and that in addition, the pro-
visions for the use of stamps, the collection procedures, 
and the provision giving the Tax Commission the job 
of administering both the regulatory and taxing pro-
vision of the Act are also cognate. ( 59-18-14, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953.) In fact, then, the Act imposes tax-
ation and regulation on both products in a like man-
ner. The deletion by the legislature of the licensing 
requirements for oleomargarine dealers merely estab-
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lished one dissimilarity, but as aforementioned, the 
fact that the provisions differ in some respects does not 
render the Act unconstitutional. State v. Twitchell, 
8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075 (1959). Nor need 
the connection or relationship be logical. M artineaux 
v. C·rabbe, 46 Utah 327, 150 P. 304 (1915) though 
the Tax Commission contends that in this instance 
the connection and relationship is logical. 
The Carter v. State Tax Commission case which 
taxpayers cite on page 11 of their brief to give support 
to their attack is readily distinguishable in that the title 
of that Act gave no hint of revenue provisions con-
tained therein. The statute was under the Motor Ve-
hicle Act, and the legislature did not in fact intend 
that the statute should be a revenue act. The court, 
however, held that in spite of legislative intent the 
provision was in fact a revenue position. There was 
no way the reader could be apprised of a tax contained 
and imposed therein. 
In the M artineaux case, it is stated that 
"* * * if * * * by any rea-
sonable construction, the title of the act can be 
made to conform to the constitutional require-
ments, it is the duty of the Courts to adopt this 
construction rather than another, which will 
defeat the act. * * * In case of doubt it 
must be assumed that the legislature understood 
and applied the title so as to comply with the 
constitutional provision, and not contrary 
thereto.'' 
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III. NEITHER THE OLEOMARGARINE 
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, 
CHAPTER 18, UTAH CODE A N N 0 -
TATED, 1953, NOR THE ADMINISTRA-
TION THEREOF BY THE STATE TAX 
COMMISSION IN THIS CASE, VIOLATES 
THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES OR UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Taxpayers contend in Point III of their brief that 
the oleomargarine tax violates Amendment V and 
Amendment XIV, Section I of the Constitution of the 
United States and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah which provide that 
"No person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty or property without due process of law." 
They also allege in their argument that the procedure 
which the Tax Commission followed in assessing the 
tax and arriving at a determination that the assessment 
was valid was violative of those same Due Process 
prOVlSlOnS. 
T'he Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution is not applicable to state legislation. Brown 
v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. Ed. 819, 16 S. Ct. 
644. It is a limitation upon the powers of Congress. 
Ibid. 
The Fourteenth Amendment ts admittedly ap-
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plicable to state legislation, Ibid. and due process ob-
jections are generally treated the same for purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the state clauses, 
Untermyer v. State Tax Comm., 102 Ut. 214, 129 
P. 2d 881 ( 1941). We will consider them jointly for 
the purposes of this brief. 
Due Process Clauses are applied as a limitation 
upon the taxing power of the states only in rare and 
special instances. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. 
S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 (1934); Garrett 
Freight Lines v. State Tax Comm., 103 Utah 390, 
135 P. 2d 523, 146 A. L. R. 1003 (1943). A par-
ticular tax law * * * will not be struck down 
as a violation of due process unless the state's action 
is palpably arbitrary or grossly unequal in its applica-
tion to the persons concerned. Magnano Co. v. Ham-
ilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. ~ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 
( 1934) and see 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 91. In nearly every 
case * * * except those cases where notice and 
hearing are involved, the United States Supreme Court 
has rejected such a contention without discussion. 
Cooley, Taxation, 4 on E., ( 1924) Vol. I, Sec. 14 3. 
Property taken in the lawful sense of the taxing 
power is not taken without due process of law, regard-
less of the amount of that tax. Magnano Co. v. Ham-
ilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 
( 1934). A tax does not violate the due process clause 
because it operates unjustly, even to the extent of de-
stroying a lawful business. Ibid . 
• 
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If the tax is for private instead of a public pur .. 
pose, the due process clause is violated. This is also 
true where a tax is upon part only of those belonging 
to the same class. Cooley Taxation, 4th E., ( 1924), 
Volume I, Section 14 3. Taxes can be for a public pur-
pose although imposed other than for purposes of rev-
enue, such as tariff duties for the encouragement of 
manufacturers or license fees upon certain obligations 
with a view to regulation. Cooley Taxation, 4th E. 
( 1924), Volume I, Section 182. The determination 
as to what is and what is not a public purpose belongs 
in the first instance to the legislative department. State 
ex rei. Douglas County v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 74 
N. W. 59, 39 L. R. A. 513, 38 Am. St. Rep. 629. 
The presumption is that a tax is valid;-that the 
motives of legislature were public;-that the legisla-
ture acted honestly and with fair purpose;-that it 
moved with deliberate judgment. Cooley Taxation, 
4th E. ( 1924), Volume I, Section 188. To justify 
the court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring 
the tax void, the absence of all public interest in the 
purpose for which the funds are raised must be clear 
and palpable. Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624; 
see Cooley, Taxation 4th E. ( 1924), Vol. I, Section 
189. Taxes to upbuild or improve the agricultural re-
sources of the state have been upheld as not being vio-
lative of due process. Cooley, Taxation, 4th E. 
( 1924), Volume I, Sec. 205. Taxation in aid of pri-
vate industry has been held proper if the industry to 
be benefited should be one of such magnitude in that 
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its property constitutes a substantial element of the 
public welfare, or it should be of a character which 
renders it important to the public. Cooley, Taxation, 
4th E. ( 1924), Volume I, Section 205. 
Administrative process of the customary sort is 
as much due process of law as judicial process. Jen-
kins v. Ballantyne, 8 U. 245, 249, 30 P. 760, 16 L. 
R. A. 689 ( 1892). In depriving a person of life or 
liberty, or property, the essentials of due process are: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, body, or 
agency authorized by law to determine the questions; 
(b) an inquiry into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the person of the 
inauguration and purpose of the inquiry and the time 
at which such person should appear if he wishes to be 
heard; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel; 
(e) fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine and 
cross-examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be rendered 
upon the record thus made. In the absence of statute 
laying down other or more specific requirements, the 
above conditions meet the demands of due process. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314 
(1945). 
The Tax Commission has accepted the facts sub-
stantially as they were set out by taxpayers, but con-
tends that the fact stipulated to by both parties, that 
the tax was assessed against "all quantities of oleomar-
garine that were sent to and received by them" neces-
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sarily implies that the oleomargarine involved was, for 
a time at least, in taxpayers' possession. The Tax 
Commission found it necessary to examine the sales 
records of a third party who dealt with the taxpay-
ers, due to the incomplete nature of their records, and 
taxpayers made no attempt to introduce facts that 
would refute the finding of fact that the oleomargarine 
was in fact received by them. 
''* * * The presence of any package 
or container in the place of business of any per-
son required by the provisions of this chapter 
to stamp the same shall be prima facie evidence 
that they are intended for sale and subject to 
tax under this chapter." 59-18-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 19 53. 
There was, then, a prima facie case before the 
Tax Commission that the oleomargarine in question 
was intended for sale and subjct to tax under the oleo-
margarine tax statute. As a result, it is not necessary, 
under our statute, to find that the taxpayers did in 
fact sell the oleomargarine. It is not necessary to find 
as fact that they possessed it longer than 72 hours. 
Taxpayers must overturn the prima facie case before 
the Tax Commission, and their flat, unsupported de-
nial that the oleomargarine was not held for sale or 
in their possession for less than 72 hours, was not suf-
ficient to overturn that case. 
The Tax Commission agents did not act improp-
erly in making their assessment based on records of 
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deliveries. That was a practical and reasonable mode 
of audit. 
As to the prima facie case set up by statute in 59-
18-5 (2), which the Tax Commission relied on, and 
justifiably so, as the Tax Commission has no business 
questioning the validity or constitutionality of legis-
lative enactments. Shea v. State Tax Comm., 101 
Utah 209, 120 P. 2d 274 (1941). Thus, that body 
was duty bound to follow statutory mandates and 
procedures. 
'' * * * it is com pet en t for a legisla-
tive body to provide by statute * * * 
that certain facts shall be prima facie or pre--
sumptive evidence of other facts, if there is a 
natural relationship between the facts proved 
and those presumed. Such clauses do not violate 
federal or state due process requirements. ( 86 
A. L. R. 180 and collected cases.) It is only in-
valid when the presumption is arbitrary, and 
there is no rational connection, or the law oper-
ates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it.'' 
Ibid. 
This is but the enactment of a rule of evidence, 
and it quite within the general power of the govern-
ment; the law of evidence is full of presumptions, 
either of fact or law. There must only be a connection 
between them in reason or experience and a fair oppor-
tunity of rebuttal. State v. Parella, 40 U tab 56, 119 
Pac. 1023 ( 1911); State v. Converse, 40 Utah 72, 
119 Pac. 1 0 3 0 ( 19 \-L) . 
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The taxpayers were properly audited and given 
the opportunity of a hearing before the Utah State 
Tax Commission. In that hearing they were given 
full opportunity to present their version of the law 
and the facts through counsel, and the Tax Commis-
sion properly followed the mandate of the statute un-
der which it operates. Taxpayers were given proced-
ural due process in all particulars. 
IV. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS 
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES 
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SECTION 24, 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Under Point II, taxpayers contend that the oleo-
margarine act as set forth in Title 59, Chapter 18, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a violation of Article 
I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution, which states 
that: 
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation.'' 
They point to the split-tax provisions of the Utah 
law, which tax the sale of colored oleomargarine at a 
higher rate than the sale of uncolored oleomargarine 
and allege that such provisions are unjustly discrim-
inatory and thus unconstitutional. They, then, in 
the closing sentence of Point II, incidentally refer to 
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the fact that colored oleomargarine is also classified 
differently than butter and other foodstuffs. 
Classifications in an enactment will not be held 
invalid merely because they may create hypothetical 
or theoretical discriminations, such discriminations 
having no effect upon the actual parties to the litiga-
tion in which the valdity of the legislation is chal-
lenged. Roberts and S. Co. v. Emerson, 271 U. S. 
50, 70 L. Ed. 827, 46 S. Ct. 375, 45 A. L. R. 1495; 
see 51, Am. J ur., Sec. 181 and collected cases. There 
is no showing by taxpayers that the split-tax provi-
sions of the Utah Act are arbitrary and discriminatory 
in their application to them. A person seeking to raise 
the question of the validity of a discriminatory statute 
has no standing for that purpose unless he belongs to 
the class which is prejudiced by the statute and where 
the class which includes the party complaining is in 
no manner prejudiced, First Nat. Bank v. Louisiana 
State Tax Commission, 289 U. S. 60, 77 L. Ed. 
1030, 53 S. Ct. 511,87 A. L. R. 840; See 11 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 114 and collected cases, it is immaterial 
whether a law discriminates against other classes or 
denies other persons equal protection of the law. See 
11 Am. J ur. Sec. 113 and collected cases; M onamotor 
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 78 L. Ed. 1141, 
54 S. Ct. 575. The court will not pass upon a consti-
tutional question unless it is absolutely necessary in 
deciding a case. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 76 
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L. Ed. 598, 52 S. Ct. 285; see 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 93 
and collected cases. 
Taxpayers show no evidence of the tax having 
a confiscatory or destructive effect on their business. 
They only contend that the tax is higher than that 
of other foodstuffs. It should be pointed out that 
"their is no imperative requirement that taxes 
shall be absolutely equal. This would stop the 
operation of government." Cooley, Taxation, 
4th E., (1924), Volume I, Section 259. 
"Rates may be fixed differently for dif-
ferent classes, provided the classification is not 
purely arbitrary." Com. v. Merchants' and 
Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 168 Pa. St. 309, 31 
Stl. 1065; Cooley, Taxation, 4th E., ( 1924), 
Volume I, Section 292. 
Uniformity requirements of a State Constitution 
do not prohibit the making of classifications nor of 
sub-classifications in state legslation relating to taxa-
tion, Feath~erstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 3 70, 153 S. 
E. 58, 70 A. L. R. 449; See 51 Am. Jur. 179 and 
collected cases; and the state legislators have the right 
to select the differences upon which such classifications 
should be based. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 
63 L. Ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; see 51 Am. Jur. Sec. 173 
and collected cases. The power of the legislature to 
classify is very broad in the field of taxation. It is 
broader than in some other exercises of legislation in 
that the grounds for classification for purposes of tax-
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ation need not be stated. Garrett Freight Lines v. State 
Tax Comm., 103 Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523, 146 A. 
L. R. 1003 ( 194 3). Such classifications may be justi-
fied even though the burdened activity may be in fact 
discouraged. The court in the Alaska Fishing and 
Salting and By-Products v. Smith (1921), 255 U.S. 
44, 41 S. Ct. 219, 65 L. Ed. 489, case faced with a 
tax which discriminated against a particular type of 
fishing indus try stated that, 
''Even if * * * [the] tax should 
destroy a business, it would not be made invalid 
* * * on that ground alone. Those who 
enter u pan a business take that risk.'' 
It also stated that protective tariffs do not contravene 
our constitution. 
Quang Wing v. Kirkendall, 233 U. S. 59, 32 S. 
Ct. 192, 56 L. Ed. 350, adopted the rationale of Mc-
Cray v. U. S. in upholding a tax statute through 
which a particular type of laundry business was de-
stroyed. The justification may be on the basis of a 
public policy which sees an advantage to the general 
discouragement of others. Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, 
welfare in the encouragement of one activity and the 
209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 97 A. L. R. 1474, 101 
A. L. R. 1359, appeal dismissed in 298 U.S. 640, 80 
L. Ed. 1372, 56 S. Ct. 750. The court said in Heiser 
v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83, 
6 7 L. Ed. 2 3 7, that a statute which taxed anthracite 
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coal and exempted bituminous coal was valid in that 
discriminations are often necessary in government in 
the best interests of society, as the purpose of the legis-
latur may be only to remove obstacles to a greater pub-
lic welfare. 
There is case law to the effect that the following 
bases of classification, discrimination, and distinction 
are valid and permissable: 
(a) Ability to bear the burden of the tax. Gar-
•ret Freight Lines v. State Tax Comm., 103 
Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523, 146 A. L. R. 
1003 (1943). 
(b) The promotion of fair competitive condi-
tion.s. Great Atlantic and P. Tea Co. v. 
Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193, 
57 S. Ct. 3, 112 A. L. R. 293. 
(c) The equalization of economic advantage. 
Ibid. 
(d) The encouragement of particular industries 
from a consideration of public policy. Miles 
v. Dept. of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199 
N. E. 372, 97 A. L. R. 1474, 101 A. L. R. 
1359, appeal dismissed in 298 U. S. 640, 
80 L. Ed. 13 72, 56 S. Ct. 750. 
The differences for purposes of classification need not 
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be great or conspicuous, State Tax Commissioners v. 
Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 75 L. Ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 
540, 73 A. L. R. 1464, 75 A. L. R. 1536, and the 
classification need not be related to the purposes for 
which the tax proceeds are to be spent. Ibid. Legisla-
tive classifications are presumed valid and the legisla-
ture is presumed to have acted in accordance with 
sound public policy. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 
83, 84 L. Ed. 590, 60S. Ct. 406, 125 A. L. R. 1383. 
The litigant attacking such a classification has the 
burden of overturning these presumptions. Ibid. 
The split-tax is probably justifiable under the 
theory that people are more likely to believe they are 
purchasing something equivalen to or as nourishing 
as butter because of the color of the oleomargarine, so 
that the competitive effect of colored oleomargarine is 
more damaging than that of the uncolored product. 
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 S. 
Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78 ( 1904), lends this theory some 
support as it held that there is such a distinction be-
tween natural butter and oleomargarine which is arti-
ficial! y colored so as to cause it to look like butter that 
the taxing of the latter and not the former cannot be 
avoided as an arbitrary exertion of the taxing power 
without any basis of classification. 
In the early days of state and federal legislation 
the position was often taken, not without some merit, 
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that oleomargarine was not a wholesome food. How-
ever, in recent years the advocates of restrictive legisla-
tion have dropped this argument to a great extent, and 
the courts now take judicial notice of the fact that 
oleomargarine is or has become a healthy and whole-
some product. 33 Va. L. Rev. 631-41 (At 633). To-
day, it is believed that the main purpose of such laws 
is the reconciling of conflicting interests, and that the 
legislature in passing such laws is merely weighing var-
ious public interests and deciding to what extent they 
shall receive legal protection, as well as to keep the 
business free from fraudulent practices and unsanitary 
conditions. Ibid. 
The dairy producers probably pay as much taxes 
per pound of butter as is directed against oleomar-
garine, due to their heavy property tax burden, so that 
the high excise tax levied on the sale of oleomargarine 
well may be in part a method of equalizing the tax 
burden of competitive businesses. We cannot afford 
suddenly to drop the protection from an industry. If 
all taxes and hampering restrictions were removed, 
there would undoubtedly be a rapid increase in the 
production of oleomargarine and the resulting collapse 
of butter prices with devastating effects on the dairy 
industry, especially the small producer. The dairy in-
dustry is carried on by many small producers, while 
there are relatively few oleomargarine manufacturers 
and their operations are sizeable. Fortune, Nov. 1944, 
P. 193. 
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"The public would feel these effects not 
only in adiminishing supply of butter but of 
the enormous quantity of food, milk, cheese and 
ice cream which are needed to sustain their high 
level of nutrition. Without our highly devel-
oped dairy industry, we would have been ser-
iously handicapped in times of national emer-
gency. The small farm is the backbone of 
American agriculture, even of the whole Ameri-
can way of life. There are too many values in-
volved to sacrifice if there is any escape. What-
ever may be the sins of the dairy lobby, they do 
not justify the destruction or crippling of the 
industry * * *." Rocky Mountain L. 
Rev. 18:79-96. Fe. 146. 
It is important at this juncture to note that, 
"* * * the growth of the industry 
(oleomargarine) has not been checked and it 
promises to grow even more rapidly * * * '' 
"* * * a prosperious and extensive dairy 
industry has been built up under the shelter of 
what amounts to a protective tariff." 
The regulatory taxation statutes and the police acts 
passed in relation to oleomargarine has achieved pro-
duction of a sanitary product, reduced the problem of 
fraud and preserved a healthy, strong dairy industry. 
Ibid. 
As pointed out, if there is a possible basis in rea-
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son for a classification made by the legislature, the 
reviewing court must presume that the legislature 
acted with such a reasonable basis in mind. The court 
will not attribute to the lawmakers a purpose to dis-
regard sound public policy except upon the most co-
gent evidence. Rowley v. P. S. C., 112 Ut. 116, 185 
P. 2d 514 (1947). The motives that influence the 
members of a legislative body raise questions between 
them and their constituents alone. Cooley, Taxation, 
4th Ed. (1924), Volume I, Section 67. The court 
should hesitate to act in a manner that might destroy 
the delicate balance of legislation. It is not the func .. 
tion of the court to overturn an act because that court 
disagrees with the reason or believes there are better 
ways of achieving the legislative goal. Masich v. U.S. 
Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 
191 P. 2d 612 ( 1948), even if to the judicial mind, 
it seems unjust or oppressive. Cooley, Taxation 4th 
Ed. (1924), Volume I, Section 67. 
Oleomargarine is not a dairy product, and the 
purpose of the legislature in Utah may well be to fos-
ter and encourage the dairy industry for the general 
good of the public and to do so by equalizing the over-
all tax burdens placed upon the two industries. The 
U. S. Supreme Court has recognized the social im-
portance of the dairy industry (see Nebbia v. People 
of the state of New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 
505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469 ( 1934)) and 
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that we do not operate under a complete laissez faire 
system. 
It is not unreasonable for a legislature to impose 
a tax on the sale of oleomargarine that it does not im-
pose on the sale of butter for those reasons. Further, 
it is logical in the light of the above mentioned legisla-
tive purpose to impose a higher tax on oleomargarine 
which is colored so as to more closely imitate butter 
and as a result to constitute more of a threat to the 
dairy industry. The courts generally refuse to pass on 
the wisdom of the legislature in protecting the dairy 
industry. The balancing of conflicting commercial 
and industrial interests for the ultimate public good 
is exclusively a legislative task under the principle of 
separation of powers. 
V. FEDERAL AND STATE CASE LAW 
UNIFORMLY SUPPORTS THE POSITION 
TAKEN BY THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, AS SET FORTH IN THIS 
BRIEF. 
At the present time 1m1tation butter is taxed 
and/ or regulated in 14 states and by the Federal Gov-
ernment. (Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah and Vermont.) 
Eight of the states impose a poundage tax, such as that 
imposed by Utah, on the sale of oleomargarine. (Col-
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orado, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Carolina, Wisconsin and Utah.) Three of those 
states, including Utah, impose a split-tax (Idaho, 
North Dakota and Utah); that is, uncolored oleo-
margarine is taxed at a lower rate than oleomargarine 
which is colored to resemble butter. Four of them com-
pletely exempt oleomargarine composed of certain sub .. 
stances produced domestically. (Colorado, Georgia, 
Minnesota and South Carolina.) All of the states have 
regulatory features written into their statutes, such as 
licensing and fee requirements, the use of stamps, and 
penalties for violation of the Act. Some of them make 
it a misdemeanor to violate the provisions of their 
Oleomargarine Acts. (Georgia, Montana, North Da-
kota, South Carolina and Wisconsin.) 
The United States Supreme Court has in a num-
ber of cases determined the constitutionality of taxes 
on imitation butter and has held such taxation valid, 
despite the high rates, and the common inclusion of 
extensive regula tory features. 
In McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 
S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, ( 1904), a case that upheld 
the Georgia State Law taxing the sale of colored oleo-
margarine at the rate of 1 Oc a pound and taxing the 
sale of uncolored oleomargarine at the rate of ~ cent 
a pound, the Court said that the Fifth Amendment 
did not prohibit the imposition of an oleomargarine 
tax which would destroy a legitimate business. It 
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stated that the court would refuse to look into the 
motives or purpose of the legislature when it was act-
ing under the scope of its taxing power; that the leg-
islature must have had in mind the difference between 
butter and oleomargarine as to content, spreadability, 
etc. This case has been followed in later decisions, 
Cliff V. United States, 195 U.S. 159, 25 S. Ct. 1, 49 
L. Ed. 139 ( 1904), and is now the settled law on the 
subject. Carotene Products Co. v. United States, 323 
U.S. 18, 65 S. Ct. 1, 89 L. Ed. 15 (1945). 
In Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 
S. Ct. 399, 78 L. Ed. 1109 (1934), the court an}-
swered the question as to whether a tax of 15c per 
pound on the sale of all oleomargarine within the state 
of Washington was violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It was held that the difference between 
butter and oleomargarine was sufficient to warrant a 
separate classification for tax purposes and that the 
tax did not violate the Due Process Clause even though 
its application would result in the destruction of the 
oleomargarine business (Citing with approval McCray 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. 
Ed. 78 ( 1940). 
The cases that have struck down oleomargarine 
statutes have generally done so because they were im-
proper exercises of the police power. Flynn v. Horst, 
(1947) 365 Pa. 20, 51 Atl. 2d 54. Utah's Act is 
primarily a revenue measure, and though it has regula-
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tory features, this is not improper nor is it inconsistent. 
(Cooley Taxation 4th E., (1924) Volume 1, S 27.) 
In Hammond Packing Co. V. Montana, 233 U. 
S. 331, 34 S. Ct. 596, 58 L. Ed. 985, a Montana 
poundage tax was tested by the United States Supreme 
Court and attacked on the ground that the distinction 
beween butter and oleomargarine is not such as to jus-
tify separate classification. The Court stated that 
there was enough difference between oleomargarine 
and butter to justify separate classifications, and said: 
"* * * . h a state rna y restr1ct t e man-
ufacture of oleomargarine in a way which does 
not hamper that of butter * * * it may 
even forbid the manufacture of oleomargarine 
altogether * * * it may express a n d 
carry out its policy as well in a revenue act as 
in a police law." (Citing the Mangano Co. v. 
Hamilton case with approval.) 
B·est Foods v. Welch, decided in a federal district 
court, 1929, 34 F. 2d 682, upheld the Idaho oleomar-
garine statute, and in doing so stated: 
"An act is not objectionable because oleo-
margarine is placed in a classification by itself 
* * *" . 
"Such legislation has reduced the chances 
of fraud." 53 Harvard Law Review 1281 
( 1940); "Fortune", November 1944, pg. 193, 
Column 2. 
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The court said in sustaining the Idaho Act as a 
revenue measure that: 
'' * * * a court cannot consider the 
reasonableness of the amount * * * the 
exercise of acknowledged power may not be 
scrutinized by the court. The responsibility 
rests upon the legislature and if unreasonably 
exercised redress rests with the people * * * 
The act is not objectionable because oleomar-
garine is placed in a class by itself * * * '' 
The Idaho Act provided for a license fee on 
wholesalers and retailers. There was no provision in 
the Act for supervision or regulation of dealers. There 
was a penalty provided for violations. The fees and 
taxes collected went into the general fund. Appellant 
attacked the act as a regulatory measure, but the Dis-
trict Court held it to be a revenue act. 
State courts have tended, more than the United 
States Supreme Court, to declare entire oleomargarine 
statutes invalid as a violation of either the Federal 
Constitution or the State Constitution. However, a 
state statute imposing a tax on all oleomargarine was 
held valid by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in 
Schmitt v. Nord, 27 N. W. 2d 910 (1947). The 
court followed the Magnano decision refusing to look 
behind the revenue designation of the law. A similar 
tax was held to violate the Kentucky Constitution in 
Field Packing Co. v. Glenn, 5 Fed. Supp. 4 (W. D. 
Kentucky 1933, Modified 290 U. S. 177, 54 S. Ct. 
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138, 78 L. Ed. 252, 1933). Here the Constitution 
specifically prohibited the destruction of a legitimate 
business by taxation. Of course, no showing of such 
destruction is before this court. On the contrary, the 
court could take notice of the continued existence of 
the oleomargarine business in the State of Utah. 
There are many federal and state cases dealing 
with oleomargarine regulations under the police power 
but which are not relevant in this case. Typical deci-
sions illustrate that the courts have refused to pass 
on the motives of the legislature, recognizing the sepa-
ration of powers as essential to our system of govern-
ment. 
It has been determined by the highest court of 
Georgia (Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S. E. 26) 
and a Federal Court of Appeals in Wisconsin (State 
of Wise. v. Segal Produce Co., Circuit Court, Outa-
gamie County, Nov. 22, 1957, March 2, 1938) that 
the oleomargarine laws invoked in those states were 
constitutional. Nebraska's Supreme Court held that 
their excise tax on the sale of oleomargarine violated 
that section of the State Constitution which required 
uniformity of classification in that it discriminated 
against imported oleomargarine without any reason-
able basis (Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N. W. 
2d 644). The Vermont Supreme Court held that its 
oleomargarine fees were unconstitutional as they were 
not in proportion to the cost of the regulation required 
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(Flynn, et al. v. Horst, et al., ('47), 356 Pa. 696, 
51 A. 2d 54). However, the Nebraska and Vermont 
cases are obviously distinguishable from the case before 
this court. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE INTENT C A N B E 
CLEARLY DISCERNED FROM THE PRO-
V I S I 0 N S OF THE OLEOMARGARINE 
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAP-
TER 18, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AND THOSE PROVISIONS CAN BE 
HARMONIZED SO AS TO GIVE EACH 
ONE MEANING, AND SUPPORT THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT. 
Section 59-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
admittedly makes no reference to oleomargarine deal-
ers, but only requires that a license be obtained by 
dealers in cigarettes and cigarette papers. There is no 
provision in any section of the statute for licensing 
oleomargarine dealers. 
59-18-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, imposes 
a tax upon the sale of tobacco and oleomargarine. 59-
18-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that: 
"The taxes imposed by this chapter shall 
be paid by affixing stamps in the manner and 
at the time herein set forth unless otherwise re-
quired by regulation of the State Tax Commis-
sion.'' (Emphasis supplied.) 
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Thus, the Act requires the payment of taxes through 
the affixation of stamps on both products. 
59-18-5(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides that in the case of oleomargarine the stamps shall 
be securely affixed at the time and in the manner which 
the Tax Commission may by regulation require. (Em-
phasis suppled.) That subsection goes on to state 
that: 
"such stamps shall be affixed * * * within 
seventy-two hours afetr any of the above com-
modities are received by any wholesaler, distrib-
utor or retailer within this state, provided, 
however, that all such commodities must be 
stamped before being sold within the state." 
It is true that the section states at a later juncture that: 
"It is the intent and purpose of this chap-
ter to require all * * * distributors and 
retail dealers * * * to affix the stamps 
provided for in this section to the packages or 
containers of products referred to in Section 59-
18-1 * * *." 
and that as staed hereinabove 59-18-1 makes no men-
ion of oleomargarine. However, 59-18-4 and 59-18-5 
imposes a tax on the sale of oleomargarine and requires 
that stamps be affixed to containers and packages of 
oleomargarine. The conflicting clause can be recon-
ciled only if it is recognized that the intent of the leg-
islature was to refer back to 59-18-4 or, that the leg-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
islature through oversight omitted the mention of 
oleomargarine in 59-18-1, or more probably that 
when the legislature deleted the oleomargarine license 
provision in 1947 and amended what was then 93-
1-1, and which for purposs of this brief is known as 
59-18-1, it neglected to peruse the rest of the statu tory 
sections and to bring them into harmony with the 
amended section. To construe this statute in any other 
manner is to render it meaningless. 
Further on in 59-18-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, it is provided that, 
"The presence of any package or container 
in the place of business of any person requi·red 
by the provisions of this chapter to stamp the 
same shall be prima facie evidence that they are 
intended for sale and subject to tax under this 
chapter." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Since we have quoted provisions of the chapter in 
question that require oleomargarine to be stamped, 
this clause must of necessity also apply to oleomargar-
ine and oleomargarine dealers. 
59-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, empow-
ers the State Tax Commission to provide 
"the methods of affixing and cancelling stamp 
that shall be employed by persons engaged in 
the sale of any of the products subject to the 
tax imposed by this chapter * * *." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
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The chapter, of course, provides for a tax on the sale 
of oleomargarine and the provision just quoted makes 
mandatory the affixing of and cancelling stamps by 
persons engaged in the sale of oleomargarine. 
59-18-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, gtves 
the State Auditor the authority to have stamps pre-
pared for use on packages and containers of "any of 
the products enumerated in 59-18-1, the sale of which 
is subject to tax under this chapter.,, (Emphasis sup-
plied.) This cannot reasonably be construed to deny 
him authority to prepare stamps for use on oleomar-
garine packages but was quite evidently an oversight 
due to the obvious error previously mentioned of the 
legislatur' s failure to harmonize the provisions of the 
statute upon amending a portion of it. 
This section goes on to say that 
"when any articles, the sale of which is taxable 
under this chapter * * * and upon which 
such taxes have been paid are sold and shipped 
to a regular dealer in such articles in another 
state, the seller in this state shall be entitled to 
a refund * * * upon condition t h a t 
* * * he shall furnish from the purchaser 
a written acknowledgment that he has received 
such goods and the amount of stamps thereon 
* * *." (Emphasis supplied.) 
''The taxes shall be refunded in the man-
ner provided above for the redemption of un-
used stamps." 
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We have previously established that oleomargarine is 
taxed under the provision of this Act. 
At another point in 59-18-10, it is provided that 
"The State Tax Commission shall sell the 
stamps herein provided for only to persons 
holding licenses as provided in this chapter.'' 
This is quite evidently in conflict with the aforemen-
tioned sections of the statute and can only be reconciled 
by acknowledging that the legislature in amending 
59-18-1 and withdrawing the requirement of oleo-
margarine licenses neglected to consider the effect of 
such an amendment on the other sections of the statute 
and to bring them into a harmonious relationship with 
other portions of the statute. 
Legislative oversight is further highlighted by the 
title of this Act which was ''Oleomargarine and To-
bacco Licenses.'' This was not changed, even though 
the provision for licensing oleomargarine dealers had 
been deleted. 
The Tax Commission contends that the intent 
of the legislature was that the above mentioned stat-
utory clauses should relate to oleomargarine as well 
as to tobacco. 
The court will give effect to all the sections of an 
act, if possible. (Western Auto Transpo·rt V. Reese, 
104 Ut. 393, 140 P. 2d 348 (1943). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
That interpretation which will give effect to each 
statutory provision and harmonize them with each 
other so that on one of them will be meaningless must 
be adopted if possible, since it is not to be presumed 
that the legislature would enact a meaningless statute. 
(Smith v. American Packing and Provision Co., 102 
Ut. 351, 130 P. 2d 951 ( 19 ____ ); each part or section 
of a statute should be construed in connection with 
every other part or section so as to produce a harmon-
ious whole. (Rowley v. P. S. C., 112 Ut. 116, 185 
P. 2d 514 ( 194 7). 
"Where the Legislature's intent is ascer .. 
tainable from the context of a statute, not with-
standing the omission of words by inadvert-
ance or clerical error, the court will insert the 
words necessary to carry out such intent, and 
the act will not be declared invalid for uncer-
tainty, where reason demands the insertion of 
words therein." (Norville v. State Tax Com-
mission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937 (1940), 
126 A. L. R. 1318.) 
Where a literal interpretation of a statute gives an ab-
surd result, the court may search the enactment for 
further indications of legislative intent by examina-
tion of the wording of the act. (Rowley v. P. S. C., 
112 Ut. 116, 185 P. 2d 514 (1947). The construc-
tion urged by the Tax Commission would harmonize 
all of thep revisions of this statute and give them effect 
and significance. It would support the validity of the 
statute and carry out the intent of the legislature. For 
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these reasons the Tax Commission contends that the 
court should accept that construction. 
VII. THE RULE OF STRICT C 0 N-
STRUCTION OF TAXING STATUTES IS 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Taxpayers, in the concluding paragraph of their 
brief. allege without supporting authority that the 
oleomargarine law in question should be strictly con-
strued if not deemed unconstitutional. However, the 
rule of strict construction of taxing statutes is not ap-
plicable in this case. The rule that tax statutes are to 
be liberal! y construed in favor of the taxpayer is only 
imposed in case there is doubt as to the intention of the 
legislature or as to the authority of the Commission. 
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Ut. 170, Moss 
v. Board of Commissioners, 4 Ut. 2d 60. In the pres-
ent case there is absolutely no doubt as to the intention 
of the legislature to tax the sale of oleomargarine or as 
to the authority of the Commission to enforce the 
mandate of the legislature. This is in accordance with 
a notable authority on taxation, e. g., Cooley, Taxa-
tion, Volume II, Section 505, Pages 1125, wherein it 
is stated: 
"Without regard asto whether tax statutes 
should receive a strict or liberal construction, it 
is elementary that they should receive a fair con-
struction to effect the end for which they were 
intended. This does not mean such a construe-
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tion as to defeat the intention of the legislature. 
Where there is really no ambiguity the rule that 
the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the 
taxpayer does not, of course, apply." 
In addition, we point out at this juncture that 
the construction given a statute by those given the 
duty of executing it is always entitled to the most re-
spectful consideration and ought not to be overruled 
without cogent reasons. McKendrick v. State Tax 
Commission, 9 Ut. 2d 418, 347 P. 2d 177 (1959). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the oleomarga-
~ 
rine .',~ct, as set forth in Title 59, Chapter 18, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, should be upheld as consti-
tutional. All presumptions are in favor of its validity. 
The classifications contained therein are reasonable in 
the light of its purposes. It does not violate the re-
quirements of due process of law, either procedurally 
or substantively. Its contents are germane to one an-
other and to its title, and its provisions, when con-
sidered together, can be reasonably construed so as to 
effectuate the intention of the legislature. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
NORMAN S. JOHNSON, 
Asst. Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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